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Economic Crisis and Reform in Bulgaria, 1989-92 
Jonathan B. ·Wight 
University of Richmond 
and 
M. Louise Fox 
The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
"Bulgarian common sense rejects [socialist principles], nor will they now or ever 
fmd favorable soil in Bulgaria." 
-Ivan Vazov, Under the Yoke (1889) 
Bulgaria's economy began a deep and prolonged collapse in 1989, exactly one 
hundred years after the noted Bulgarian novelist Ivan Vazov published his stirring 
novel opposing the tyranny of the Ottomans and warning of the mistaken road of 
socialism. The 1989 collapse was partially a reflection of the external political 
upheavals among Bulgaria's trading partners in Eastern Europe, which were 
rejecting socialist principles. But it was also a reflection of the weaknesses 
imbedded in the economy after 30 years of central planning. Political instability 
within Bulgaria, market reforms, and attempts at privatization contributed further 
to economic uncertainty resulting in a continued output decline. The almost thirty 
percent fall in real Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") over the period 1989-1992 
left approximately one-half million workers unemployed, and many more 
underemployed in this country of approximately nine million people. 
This paper examines the reasons for the collapse of the macroeconomy, 
sketches the initial reforms and privatization programs, and assesses the capacity 
of the social safety net to deal with the inevitable economic dislocations. The 
years 1989-92 are critical not only for the formation and nurturing of the 
democratic movement in Bulgaria, but also as a period of popular support for 
reform (as a theoretical construct), in a cathartic recoil against the old system. 
The ultimate unraveling of this support, leading to anti-reform backlash 
movements, can be understood by examining Bulgaria's particular historical 
conditions, which made the costs of reform much greater than anyone dared to 
predict. Before addressing these main issues, Bulgaria's economic history is 
briefly reviewed. 
I. Overview of the Bulgarian Economy 
Bulgaria's economy remained largely agricultural for the flrst half of the 20th 
century. Peasants owning small plots of land accounted for 80 percent of 
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Bulgaria's population in 1900, and this changed little over the next fifty years 
(Pundeff 1992:67). After the Second World War, Bulgaria's economy was 
rapidly industrialized through state-mandated Five Year Plans, and trade relations 
became consolidated within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
("CMEA" or "Comecon"). Labor and investment resources were channeled 
Soviet-style, away from agriculture and into new specialized industries ~ 
machinery, consumer goods, chemicals, iron, steel, and later, electronics. 
Significant economic growth took place during the four decades of communist 
rule. However, this growth was in some senses cancerous; much of it was not 
productive given Bulgaria's resource constraints, and ultimately led to 
environmental degradation and economic collapse. 
According to Ognian Pishev (1991:108), economic advisor to the Union of 
Democratic Forces ("UDF') and ambassador to the United States, Bulgaria's 
economy did not develop in an efficient manner: The commodity structure of 
Bulgarian industry is defmed not by the comparative advantages it possesses, but 
by the interests of its largest market, the Soviet Union. However, by having 
chosen such an unsaturated market, and one with such low demands on quality, 
competitiveness in Western markets is inevitably lost. 
The close connection with the USSR was tenaciously courted by former 
communist ruler Todor Zhivkov, who reputedly wanted to make Bulgaria a 
republic of the USSR, with the countries sharing a "common circulatory system" 
(Pundeff 1991:104). 
By 1990, Bulgaria's per capita GOP stood at about $2,250 (Table 1). 
~ompared to other countries within the Eastern European bloc, Bulgaria's average 
mcome in 1990 exceeded Poland's and Romania's, but fell short of what was 
ac~ieved in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. Compared to its bordering 
ne1ghbors to the south, Bulgaria's standard of living was less than half that in 
Greece, but 40 percent higher than in Turkey.t Bulgaria had the highest life 
expectancy of any Eastern European country. With a relatively small land rnass 
but small population, population density is one of the lowest in Eastern Europe at 
81 persons per square kilometer. 
At the time of the Soviet collapse, Bulgaria's Gross Domestic Product was 
derived 52 percent from industry, 31 percent from services, and only 18 percent 
from agriculture (World Bank 1995). During the 1980s, industrial output had 
grown by 4.6 percent per year and services by 1.3 percent. Agricultural output, 
however, declined by almost three percent per year during this decade (World 
Bank 1992:231-33). Agricultural productivity had slowed since the late 1960s, a 
fact which led to a series of reforms (Boyd 1990). In 1979, a New Economic 
Mechanism ("NEM") allowed for greater decentralization and price incentives, but 
even this could not tum the tide in agriculture. Not surprising, rural areas lost 
population; while less than half of Bulgaria's population lived in urban areas in 
1965, over two-thirds did by 1990 (World Bank 1992:279). 
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In the 1980s, exports to CMEA countries accounted for two-thirds of 
Bul aria's exports. The bulk of these (around three-f?u~s) wen~ to the ':JSSR 
{W;rld Bank 1991:1:15). Bulgaria's exports to soc1ahst countnes (a shghtly 
broader group than just CMEA) consisted mainly of investment g~ods (63 
percent), foodstuffs (13 percent), and consumer good~ (~ 1 percent), w1th oth~r 
sectors playing minor roles, as shown in T_able ~· W1thm the CMEA. Bulga~a 
became a specialized producer of electromc equipment. In exchange::, Bulgana 
imported from socialist countries mainly investment goods ~d fuels, mmeral •. ~d 
metals (each on average accounting for 43 percent of total Imports from soc.ahst 
countries). Bulgaria's dependence on the CMEA market, and within that mark~t, 
on investment goods exports, made it particularly vulnerable when the economies 
of the CMEA system all plunged into depression d~ring 1990-9~. . . 
In terms of Bulgaria's growing trade w1th non-socmhst countnes, a 
significant share of exports was accounted for once again by sales .of .~vestment 
goods (34 percent) and fuels, minerals, and metals (27 percent). S1gmf1cant al~o 
were exports of foodstuff~ (9 perce~t), and a ~ariety of other products. Bulgana 
imported from non-sociahst countnes mostly mvestrnent goods (25 percent) and 
fuels, minerals, and metals (33 percent), this latter item ~co~ing ever m?re 
important as Bulgaria sought to break its dependence on Sov1et od by de~el_opmg 
ties with Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and others. This strategy also hu~ Bulgana m. the 
1990s as the Gulf War left Bulgaria owed oil by these countnes under vanous 
comm'odity trading schemes. but un~ble t? .receive it. . . 
Despite the early successes m ra1smg per captt~ mcor.ne, b~ the 1980s 
Bulgaria's economy remained tightly linked to the h1ghly meffic1ent <;MEA 
trading bloc. Commodity exports and imports w~re v~lued at an astoundmg. 8~ 
percent of Bulgaria's GDP in 1989. CMEA countnes could not pay .f~r ~ulgan~ s 
exports in "hard" (convertible) currencies •. and accept~d Bulgal!a s mdustnal 
exports because Bulgaria would accept the1r raw maten~ls. Th1s system w~ 
highly inefficient, in that distorted input and output pnces led _to system~tlc 
misallocations of resources throughout the trading bloc. The resultmg stagnation 
in productivity reduced living standards V:hich ultimately contributed to the 
growing movement for political and econom1c reform. 
II. Macroeconomic Collapse in 1989-92 
The macroeconomic decline which began in 1989 and deepene<_l into 19~0-92 can 
be traced to intemal and external forces which took shape m t~e _mld-1980s. 
Foremost among these was the decline in the value of exports, the nse m the. val~e 
of imports, the surge in foreign indebtedness, and the consequent expl~s10n m 
debt servicing demands. The inability to s~rvice these debts created a cred1t freeze 
which paralyzed the economy over the penod 1990-92. 
Reliable estimates of the value of trade are diff!.c~lt to construct _for several 
reasons. First, CMEA trade is recorded using admtmstered ruble pnces, rather 
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than world market prices. This seriously distorts the real value of trade, and in 
the case of CMEA trade, presents a bias which overestimates Bulgaria's exports.2 
Second, trade dat~ with non-CMEA countries deno~inated in the local currency 
(the lev) underestunates the dollar value of trade smce the lev was consistently 
overvalued. The trade data presented here were constructed by The World Bank 
(1991). 
As illustrated in Figure 1, Bulgaria's commodity trade with CMEA 
countries resulted in trade deficits up until 1988 and 1989. This reflected 
Bulgaria's dependence on imported Soviet oil in the early 1980s. These trade 
deficits were partially offset, however, by positive net sales of services to CMEA 
countries. This reflected Bulgaria's growing popularity as a tourist destination on 
the Black Sea. Nevertheless, the current account deficit within the CMEA was 
n~gative for most of the 1980s.3 In the late 1980s this situation reversed itself, 
wrth Bulgaria actually achieving surpluses in commodity trade with CMEA 
countries, primarily through a reduction in the value of imports and continued 
strong exports of goods and services to CMEA countries. While the decline in 
CMEA imports in the late 1980s produced an impressive trade surplus, it held the 
seeds for disaster on another trade front. 
There is an important connection between CMEA and non-CMEA trade. 
Soviet oil was both an input used to carry out production and a raw material to be 
processed for re-export. The decline in availability of Soviet oil in the latter part 
of the 1980s created a shortage of raw material for re-export. 
Thus the external cause of the 1989 collapse can be traced to Bulgaria's 
de~lining exports to non-CMEA nations (also shown in Figure 1). While Bulgaria 
enJoyed trade surpluses with this group in the early 1980s, a large trade deficit 
emerged in the middle of this decade. Bulgaria's current account deficit spiraled 
from $85 million in 1985 to $1.3 billion by 1989. Initially Bulgaria was able to 
finance this deficit with loans from abroad. Bulgaria's foreign debt soared frorn 
$3.2 billion to $9.2 billion over 1985-89 (World Bank 1991:1: 157). By early 
1992, the foreign debt had risen further to $12.2 billion (Engelbrekt 1992:37), or 
approximately $1,300 per person.4 
The resulting shortage of hard currency needed to service this debt created 
sup~ly bottlenecks, owing to the lack of imported raw materials, spare parts, and 
equrpment. As a consequence, real GDP declined by 3.3 percent in 1989, the first 
decline in forty years. Sales of services bore the brunt of this decline. 
-Deepening Recession in 1990-91 
The situation grew worse in 1990 and 1991, with declining economies of CMEA 
countries, a recession in the West, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, and a worsening 
credit crunch internationally. In March of 1990, facing the loss of international 
reserves, and rapidly declining export revenues, Bulgaria's government suspended 
principal payments on its foreign debt, and later extended this to interest payments 
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as well. Inunediately Bulgaria became a black sheep in the international lending 
community, and even short-tenn credits relating to trade were withdrawn. 
Both domestically and internationally, the Bulgarian economy was overly 
tied to an inefficient trading system.s By market standards, the Bulgarian 
currency was greatly overvalued, causing balance of payments deficits. 
Therefore, one of the first reforms began in May 1990, when the government 
· decided to correct price distortions in the international sector. The program 
entailed a substantial devaluation of the lev into a multi-tiered currency system. 
For commercial transactions, the lev was devalued by 250 percent, from two leva 
per dollar at the end of 1989 to seven leva per dollar by May 1990 (World Bank 
1991:vi).6 The currency reform program was, with hindsight, too little, too late, 
given other events. And it created new destabilizing problems. 
Devaluations tend to ignite inflation, by driving up prices for imports as 
well as domestically produced goods. At the same time, the government budget 
deficit had mushroomed from 1.5 percent of GDP in 1989 to 9.5 percent of GDP 
in 1990, causing greater monetization. It was no surprise that by the end of 1990 
inflation had surged, from 3.2 percent in 1989 to 27.3 percent in 1990 and was 
heading toward 234 percent in 1991 (Table 3). 
The sizeable devaluation in mid-1990 was not enough to counteract other 
international events which were decimating Bulgaria's export industries. The 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 led to severe reductions in oil imports 
from these countries at the very time oil from the former Soviet Union was 
similarly curtailed. Bulgaria's imports of crude oil declined steadily from 10.1 
million tons in 1989 to 6.2 million in 1990 and 4. 7 million in 1991. Bulgaria had 
also provided some $2.4 billion in export-fmancing loans to developing countries 
(Pishev 1991:1 09). These were in arrears, further hurting Bulgaria's ability to 
buy needed inputs. Iraq, for example, owed Bulgaria $1.3 billion in March 1990. 
These events deepened the sharp economic dislocations taking place within 
Bulgaria. GDP declined by 9.9 percent in 1990, and another 13.5 percent in 
1991. The main impact was felt in the industrial sector, whose production fell by 
12.5 percent in 1990 and 18.6 percent in 1991 (Table 3). 7 Most of this decline 
can be traced to the international sector, as exports of goods and services dropped 
more than 60 percent over the period 1989-91. 
Domestically, the government was unable to hold on. In the midst of a 
general strike and mass demonstrations, the coalition government led by Andrei 
Lukanov resigned at the end of 1990. It was replaced by a government led by 
Dimitar Popov. 
lii. The Economic Reforms of February 1991 
The new Popov government almost immediately began carrying out a 
comprehensive stabilization and reform program in February 1991. These 
reforms were made possible by the groundwork laid in the previous year, when in 
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September Bulgaria was admitted to the International Monetary Fund and the 
W~rld Bank. These institutions provided financial support as well as technical 
asststance. s 
The collapse of the Bulgarian economy was caused by many interrelated 
factors. I~s c:orrection would be difficult and long term. A World Bank mission 
to Bulgana m the summer of 1990 listed six institutional and policy refonns 
needed for Bulgaria to begin the transition to a market economy (The World Bank 
1991:1:65): 
1. Decontrol prices; 
2. Pr?m~te internal and external competition; 
3. Privattze a large share of state enterprises; 
4. Provi~e incenti_ve~ to managers of state enterprises; 
5. Estabhsh funct10nmg labor and capital markets· and 
6. Establish a safety net for the poor. ' 
. The progress of reform and privatization was sporadic, with mixed results 
"? th~ short term. Thi_s is not surpri_sing or unusual given the difficult political 
s1t~a~10n and the ma~mtude of the adJUStments required. A brief summary of the 
pohttcal and ec_?nomtc reforms over 1989-92 is contained in Table 4. It is beyond 
the scope of thts paper to deal with each issue in depth. Economic stabilization 
and structural ref~rms will be a~~essed in these sections before considering issue 
6 (the safety net) m greater detad m Section IV. 
-Economic Stabilization 
The traditional "_shock" therapy begun in February 1991 consisted of constraining 
demand by c~t!mg_ the budget deficit, reducing government subsidies, reducing 
real wa~es, ra~smg mterest rates, and sharply devaluing the lev. At the same time, 
s~pply_ mcenttves. were to be created by removing internal and external price 
dtstort~on~, !owermg trade barriers,9 developing markets, dismantling monopolies, 
and pnvattzmg land and other state controlled assets. As in Poland and elsewhere, 
the short-run costs of this transition were greatly underestimated. 
. Over 90 percent of producer and consumer prices were freed from controls 
m Februa'!' 1991 (with ~nly a few exceptions in essential foods, public 
transportatiOn, and temporanly on energy). In order to stabilize the international 
sector, the multi-tiered exchange rate system was replaced with a single, floating 
exchan~e rate. The floating rate quickly depreciated 150 percent on commercial 
!rans~ct10ns _(from. about 7 lev/~ to ~bout 18 lev/$). Not surprisingly, domestic 
mflat10n sptked m the hyperinflatiOn range as these pricing impacts were 
multiplied throughout the economy.10 
To curb i~ation, interest ~tes were allowed to rise (up to 52 percent 
annually by mtd-year), and ttght monetary constraints were imposed. 
Balkanistica 11 (1998) 
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND REFORM IN BULGARIA 133 
Concomitantly, the budget deficit was targeted for substantial reduction to only 
3.5 percent of GDP (although this target was missed by a broad mile). On the 
strength of these projections, however, Bulgaria was able, in April 1991, to gain 
relief on its official debts by a rescheduling at the Paris Club (an informal group 
of major creditor governments). Most of Bulgaria's debt, however, upwards of 80 
percent, was owed to private commercial banks (Engelbrekt 1992b:39), which did 
not reschedule at this time. 
The idealism of the macroeconomic goals set forth in February 1991 soon 
ran up against the realism of the economic environment and external factors, 
many of which were discussed above. The recession was far worse than expected, 
and thus projected budget revenues were far off the mark. Expenditures were also 
sharply higher for social programs as were subsidies for energy prices in the early 
part of the year. The reform movement began to stall as the initial impacts were 
felt, and entrenched bureaucracies resisted the reform process. 
In October new parliamentary elections were held. For the first time a non-
communist, Filip Dimitrov, was able to form a government of the Union of 
Democratic Forces Party ("UDF') in a coalition with the Turkish Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms Party ("MRF''). 
-Policy Reversal in 1992 
The austerity program continued under the new government for the first half of 
1992. State enterprises cut employment, government subsidies were substantially 
reduced, real wages were cut substantially, and the inflation rate moderated to 
only two percent a month by mid-1992. In addition, legislation implementing 
privatization of large state enterprises was passed in April. 
However, in mid-1992 the political coalition between the UDF and MRF 
began to unravel. The MRF, which suffered a diaspora in 1989, again found 
themselves bearing the brunt of the economic dislocations. The economic 
consequences of stabilization, for example, caused real income per capita in dollar 
terms to fall by more than 50 percent since 1989. While stabilization caused pain, 
the expected gain in structural terms had yielded little. Not surprisingly, the MRF 
pushed for less austerity and more government aid. Others, both inside and 
outside the UDF, became highly critical of the slow pace of privatization. 
President Zhelev himself became publicly critical of the government in August. 
These criticisms led to an apparent reversal of macroeconomic policy. In 
the second half of 1992 the budget deficit grew rapidly, the government's strict 
wage policy was relaxed, and inflation began to climb. This short-term change 
stemmed the decline in real GDP to only 6.1 percent in 1991 (compared to over 
13 percent in 1991). This smaller decline was not enough to save the Dimitrov 
government, however, which failed to win a vote of confidence in October and 
stepped down.u 
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-Structural Reforms, 1991-92 
As indicated previously, price liberalization took place in February 1991. 
Concurrently, Bulgaria began dismantling its international trade restrictions 
Tariffs on imports were simplified to just five rates, with the average tariff rat~ 
lowered substantially to just 18 percent by 1992 (Center for International 
Economics 1992). 12 Most non-tariff barriers were removed on a wide range of 
products. Exp~rt subsidies were removed as were most licensing systems. 
These pnce and trade reforms provided the needed incentives for a hoped-
for sup~Iy response. Exports of goods and services, for example, rose by 22 
percent m 1992. However, while the legal and institutional mechanisms began to 
be put int? pl_ace for transforming the economy to a market system, the 
transformation Itself became slowed by political and technical constraints in the 
sectors discussed below. 
-Agriculture 
The Law on Ownership and Usage of Farmland ("Land Law") was adopted 
February 22, 1991. It was intended to restore land to the original 1946 owners 
(Grosser 1992; Engelbrekt 1992a,b,c,d; Ash 1992; Nikolaev 1991, 1992; Brooks, 
et al. 1991). Several restrictions applied: a maximum of 20 hectares could be 
returned (30 hectares in hilly regions), and the land could not be sold for three 
years. The intention of these restrictions was to encourage the leasing of land to 
voluntary cooperatives which could achieve economies of scale. About I. 7 
million persons filed claims for an estimated 5.6 million hectares of arable land by 
August 4, 1992, the deadline for filing claims. 
Land restitution was to be carried out by the National Land Council (and its 
success~r, the Min!stry of Agriculture). Conflicts immediately delayed issuing 
a~propnate regulations, much less the implementation of these regulations. By 
mid-1992, only 12 percent of former owners had received restitution (Agency for· 
Economic Coordination and Development 1992:11). By the end of 1992, 
according to government sources, 460,000 hectares of land had been returned to 
previous owners in the most straightforward cases. 
Problems with other claims include the loss of fannland, changes in quality 
or use of land, surveying difficulties, the intentional destruction of records, and 
not the least, bureaucratic delay in the municipal land commissions (still populated 
by the old guard). Nikolaev (1992:3) reported that members of the nomenklatura 
toured the countryside, discouraging former owners from reclaiming their land on 
the threat of exorbitant taxes. He also reported that managers of existing state 
cooperatives physically prevented workers from leaving, in one case with the use 
of a tank. 
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-Medium and Large Size Enterprises 
The privatization of medium and large scale state enterprises proceeded even more 
slowly. By the summer of 1991 "there had not been even the slightest trace <?f 
any legal commercial system discemable in the country" (A~ency for Economic 
Coordination and Development 1992:2). The law creatmg an . Agency ~f 
Privatization was only passed in April 1992, and the Agency then dtd not begm 
work until September. . . . . 
The Agency was made responsible for pnvattzatlon of comp~~~s whose 
book values exceeded ten million leva (U.S.$420,000).12 The m1ttal steps 
involved hiring foreign consultants to ad~ise particul~r indu~trial sectors ~n 
preparation for restructuring and direct auctlo~ to the highest bidder.. B~lgana 
resisted the use of vouchers to transfer ownership of state assets, preferrmg mstead 
to attract new foreign capital. In addition to auctions, workers were able to buy 
into their companies via Employee Share Ownership Plans ("ESOPs"), as well as 
managers via buy-outs or buy-ins ("MBOs" or "MBis") (Valencia 1992). While 
the selection of foreign consultants continued, only one small company (worth 
$26,500) was sold during the first four months of 1993 (Reuter 1993 ). 
-Small Businesses 
The privatization of small businesses was to ~ave spe;u:-he~ded the 
institutional reform process (Agency for Economic Coordmat10n and 
Development 1992:8). By June 1991, th~ sale of st~~e-owned retail shops ~d 
gasoline stations had been completed. Auctions of additional assets were ceased m 
July, however, when these sales were questioned ~ue. to _lack of a~co~tabil.ity, 
lack of consistency. and lack of legal authority. Adjudtcatton of restitution clauns 
also delayed the privatization process. . 
In the formation of new businesses, more than 180,000 small busmesses 
were registered by the end of 1991, half of these single-worker firms in the 
service and retail sectors (Engelbrekt 1992:80). However, due to a plethora of 
bureaucratic delays and supply constraints, many of these were not able to start 
operation. 
-Foreign Investment 
In May 1991, a foreign investment law passed, but it was per~ei:'ed as being 
highly restrictive (Wyzan 1992). While it allowed for full repatnatiOn of profits 
and dividends it set a minimum investment amount of $50,000 to prevent 
speculation. fu addition, it prevented foreigners from owning land, tim~r and 
waterways. This discouraged foreign participation in the very areas that mtght be 
of greatest interest (agricultural products and by-products). 
Balkanistica 11 (1998) 
136 WIGHT AND FOX 
A far more liberal foreign investment law superseded this in January 1992. 
Foreigners were still prohibited from buying land, but they were allowed to lease 
land for up to 70 years. Foreign investors were otherwise accorded the same 
protection as Bulgarian nationals with few exceptions. 
Despite the more liberal law on foreign investments, little foreign 
investment was attracted. By the end of 1992, estimates were that between $100 
million and $300 million of foreign investment had entered the country, mostly of 
Turkish and Greek origin engaged in joint trading companies (Reuter 1993 :6). 
One consequence of the slow pace of refonn was a continued high 
unemployment rate. We tum now to the social safety net for those hurt by these 
economic dislocations. 
IV. The Social Safety Net 
Bulgaria began the transition to a market economy with a strong social 
infrastructure. The population was generally healthy and educated, and access to 
services was well-distributed. Owing in part to the underpricing of key sector 
inputs (especially human resources), this level of service delivery was achieved 
relatively cheaply during the centrally planned period. However, the economic 
collapse, and the ensuing economic and political reforms, fundamentally 
challenged the social sectors. New services were required (e.g., employment 
services, social assistance), while existing service delivery systems needed to be 
restructured. Political decentralization implied the development of new funding 
mechanisms. And the economic dislocation increased demand for welfare 
programs, as more Bulgarians fell into poverty. Not surprisingly. Bulgaria found 
it difficult to meet these challenges during a time of shrinking public and private 
resources. 
-Unemployment 
Increased unemployment was the most visible social impact of the refonns. 
Under a centrally planned system, unemployment was theoretically non-existent. 
School leavers were assigned jobs, and these jobs were theirs until retirement 
(barring extreme misbehavior such as absenteeism or theft). In times of falling 
output, wages simply declined. As part of the restructuring and development of a 
labor market, firms were allowed to shed workers, and were removed of their 
obligations to school leavers. In December 1989, an unemployment insurance 
scheme was initiated and funding was also provided for programs for the 
unemployed. 
In response to the lack of sales, firms indeed shed labor. By the end of 
1992, 236,000 workers (out of a labor force of 3.3 million) had received 
unemployment benefits, and the estimated unemployment rate was 17.5 percent. 
Another 347,000 registered as unemployed but did not qualify for benefits. 
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Whether the latter persons were "unemployed" in the strictly technical sense is 
unlikely, as many were not actively looking for jobs. As Bulgaria did not c~nduct 
regular labor force surveys during this period, the number of unemployed m the 
standard western sense of the word is unknown. Clearly some of those registered 
as unem~loyed found work in the private sector, as all surveys show a high rate of 
growth in this sector. Nonetheless, for a country used to cradle-to-grave 
guaranteed income, the uncertainty engendered by the reform process was 
traumatic. 
Although funding was provided for programs to assist the unemployed 
retrain or develop job search skills, few effective programs were developed as 
Bulgaria had scant expertise in this area. With foreign assistance.' gove~~nt 
services began reaching more of the unemployed, and a small pnvate trammg 
sector began to develop. Construction and commercial skills were particularly in 
demand in the private sector. 
-Welfare Programs 
Bulgaria's social welfare programs also underwent major changes. In the centrally 
planned economy, social welfare programs were primarily oriented to providing 
long-term care (nursing homes and orphanages). One social worker was assigned 
to each of the roughly two hundred municipalities. The dislocation caused by ~e 
transition necessitated a dramatic increase in staff, and new programs to prov1de 
cash transfers to households in need. The government developed and sent to 
Parliament for approval a comprehensive Social Welfare Act, which provi~ed a 
universal monthly cash benefit to all poor households. All households w1th a 
monthly income below a minimum would be entitled to a cash benefit to bring the 
household income up to the minimum level. The minimum income was adjusted 
for household size and composition according to a set of formulas, so that the 
minimum for a household of two adults and four children is roughly three and 
one-half times the minimum for a single individual. All adults in the household 
had to be working or registered with the local labor office for a family to qualify. 
Limitations were placed on property ownership and on financial assets for 
qualification. In order not to discourage labor supply, the working poor whose 
total household income was below the minimum were entitled to exclude 25 
percent of their labor income for purposes of benefit calculation. 
Social assistance programs were financed from general revenues. Despite 
the budget squeeze during this period, expenditures on social assistance were 
allowed to almost double in real terms. Staffmg increased ten-fold, and about 10 
percent more were scheduled to be added in 1993. 
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-Social Security 
Bulgaria's social security system provides pensions to retirees and the disabled, 
and short-term benefits covering absence from work due to accidents or illness. 
Expenditures rose sharply after 1989, primarily as a result of early retirement 
programs. Social security spending as a share of total government spending rose 
from 16 percent in 1989 to a dramatic 33 percent by 1991 (The World Bank 
1995). 
These programs were offered in an attempt to reduce unemployment. There 
is no evidence that they achieved that goal, as employers did not replace retirees 
with new entrants. However, the pension dependency burden (the number of 
pensioners per contributor) rose from 0.56 to a staggering 0.87 in the early 1990s, 
and was projected to reach a one-to-one ratio before the end of the decade. 
Revenues did not increase, despite a large increase in the payroll tax funding this 
system. This is because few taxes were collected from the private sector, and state 
sector employment declined. As a result, the average pension fell by 70 percent 
relative to the average wage. While the bulk of pensioners owned housing or 
other assets which could be sold or rented in order to survive, many were hard hit 
by this loss in income. 
The problem of old-age income security and poverty was not solvable 
easily. A major system reform was required, as Bulgaria's aging population 
would continue to put pressure on system revenues even if the economy had 
recovered. While the 1992 Pension Reform Act rolled back many of the early 
retirement programs, the system is not sustainable fiscally. Bulgaria's average 
retirement age (53 years) was much too low to achieve fiscal solvency. In 
addition, private savings for old-age income replacement needed to be 
encouraged. The development of a regulatory framework for private pension 
systems was particularly important. 
V. Conclusions 
Economic reforms are often highly disruptive in the short and long run, and this 
was no exception in Bulgaria's case. Because Bulgaria is a small country, highly 
dependent on external trade, the disintegration of CMEA economies had perhaps 
its most serious impact on Bulgaria. Official statistics note that exports to CMEA 
countries fell by 61 percent, and imports fell by 67 percent. Real output declined 
by 11 percent in 1991, and registered unemployment rose steadily from 3.2 
percent in the first quarter of 1991 to 17.5 percent by the last quarter of 1992. 
The Bulgarian standard of living, in nominal dollar terms, declined from $2,830 
per capita in 1989 to $1,360 per capita by 1992. 13 By almost any measure, the 
Bulgarian economy was in its most serious crisis since World War II. 
The Bulgarian reform program should be given high marks for the idealism 
of the February 1991 "shock therapy." However, it achieved far less than its 
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original goals. While some of this is due to domestic political upheaval during 
1989-92, there were other factors beyond Bulgaria's control: the deepening 
recession caused by loss of export markets and the financial and commodity 
impacts of the war in the Persian Gulf. Later, the international sanctions placed 
against Serbia in 1992 disrupted Bulgaria's vital transport links through the 
former Yugoslavia. As a consequence, Bulgaria's economy continued to decline 
in 1993, before beginning modest positive growth in 1994. 
The privatization of Bulgarian official assets and the creation of a dynamic 
private sector proceeded extremely slowly. Nevertheless, there was some 
progress: The private sector's share of real GDP grew from just 2 percent in 1990 
to 25 percent in 19~2. and officially accounted for at least 14 percent of all 
employment by that hrne (the real figure is no doubt higher, as data collection on 
private activities was primitive). In agriculture, the private sector accounted for 
half of all outp?t in 1992. Meanwhile, government subsidies, as a percentage of 
real GDP, declmed from 16 percent in 1990 to just 2 percent in 1992. While 
registered unemployment was high, activity rates were high also, as households 
struggled in the growing "informal" or "grey" economy to earn extra cash. 
Trading activities became popular, such as. small service operations (coffee and 
sandwich stands) for example. By all accounts, income distribution, which was 
relatively equal under central planning, widened during this time. 
The 1989-92 period ~ Bulgaria provides a particularly painful illustration 
of t~e costs assoc~ated WI.~ restructuring a moribund command economy. 
Despite the economic calamities, the Bulgarian people appeared initially able to 
accept stoically the price that had to be paid for reform. The famous queues of 
the centrally planned period virtually disappeared, as prices generally began to 
r~flect market forces. Th7 widespread availability of consumer goods was 
bittersweet for many Bulganans, however, as these items were now unaffordable 
on their low real wages. 
As one ~riter of this period noted, "Bulgaria seems poised between the 
moral fact of Its new freedom and the brute reality of its material crisis. Brute 
reality, at this moment, looks overwhelming, a Sisyphean weight on the mountain 
of democratic uplift." (Hoffman 1993:354) The little evidence of crime, 
malnutrition, or severe poverty during this early period underscores the 
widespread support for reform on principal. Nevertheless, the lack of sufficient 
structural reform in actuality - or with sufficient speed to allay the growing 
distrust arid resentment of the masses - sowed the seeds for the fall of the 
Dimitrov government in late 1992. In following years the deepening social unrest 
arid its worst manifestations - crime, corruption, violence - were its borne 
fruits. 
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Notes 
!:~~pt Note: John Treadway provided immeasurable assistance in the editing of this 
graterufl~ ~~V:~{::f ~e ~s research was. provided by the University of Richmond and is 
represent those of the World B~ws :-pressed m this pa~r are the authors' and do not necessarily 
1 All of th . or e governments of Its member countries. 
special p~oblems d:!~~==~~ are ~enu?us because of meas~ment problems in general, and 
the use of Bulgan·an stati"su· e Minaspnc:s m command economies. For a discussion of issues in 
.. cs, see sian (1992) . 
. 2. CMEA-administered prices tended to over-value industrial · d d al 
matenal and energy prices (World Bank 1991:1:14). pnces, an un erv ue raw 
balance3~fp~~=nt account is the sum of merchandise trade, services, and transfers in the 
Bank w!~~~ of 1989• the larg:s~ creditors (and amounts owed) to the Bulgarian Foreign Trade 
Austria ($i,02~~o~)~·~~~~~gJ:~!:·~~ ~on), United .~gdom ($1.~38 million), 
smaller amounts contracted by other Bul . banks• (Wrance ($554 million). Bulgana also owed 
5. For exam le · . gan~ . ~rldBank 1991:1:158). 
times less than in oler'c~~r:ans ;nJoyed highly subsi~ energy prices which were three-four 
since consumers were not a . s. ne consequence of this was a degradation of the environment 
6 Th ffi ial p ymg the true cost of energy production (including external costs). 
7
. Earle 0 Ictuna. exchanf gthe rate went from 0.81lev/$ to 2.97lev/$, an increase of 267 percent 
· Y es tes o e decline · Bul · ' percent for 1990 and 22.9 percent for 199~ gana s economy were greatly overstated, at 11.8 
and a T~~'!1~s=~e~r:rr:,f~~;'=o:.ank a Structural Adjustment Loan of $250 million 
9. However quantitative b d industrial export ite~s to ensure ad ans an export. taxes w_ere placed ~n a range of agricultural and 
1992:133). equate domestic supplies of certain essential products (Grosser 
25 pe~~t ~01~ ~ag.~n ;~e~~3ui~ent ~i,ebruary ~d 51 pe~ent in March. It dropped to 
energy price rises (Grosser 1992:129). ay, ore surgmg agam m June (5.9 percent) due to 
11. Following this the UDF and BSP gled 
together a coalition, since ~either side wanted t s~ £ unsucce~sfully ~or several months to put 
party was able to put forward a compromise ~di~~ erlybeelecuBons. Fmally, the minority MRF 
become Prime Minister. • yu n erov (not an MRF member) to 
12. There were five tariff rates (5 10 percent) in July 1992. percent, percent, 15 percent, 25 percent and 40 
1
143. Slt~~er companies were to be privatized by the appropriate ministries 
· IS Jmportant to bear in mind tha thi . · power parity estimates Since not all of B t • , s measured. decline does not reflect purchasing 
overstates the decline fu living standards. ulgana s economy IS traded, the fall in value of the lev 
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Table 1 Countries, 
Basic Indicators for Bulgaria and Selected European 
1990 
Populalion GNP 
Per Capila Population Area Densil}' (Persons Per ($) (Millions) (()()()'s of Sq. Kms.) 1990 Counrrv Mld-1990 Sg.l<ms.) 1.630 719 79 Turlcey 56 1,690 313 121 Poland 38 3.060 94 Yugoslavia 24 256 1.640 238 97 Romania 23 3,140 16 128 !25 Cz:echallavak.ia 
93 118 2.780 Hungary 11 5.990 132 76 Greece 10 2.250 
Bulgaria 9 111 81 
Source: World Development Report (1992). 
Table 2 
Average Composition of Bulgaria's 
Exports and Imports 
1985-891 
LifeExp. 
a1 Binh 
(Years) 
1990 
67 
71 
72 
70 
72 
71 
71 
73 
Non·Socialist Countries 
143 
Socialist Countries2 
Exports Imports 
(%) (%) Exports Imports 
34 25 
27 33 
9 2 
6 12 
7 5 
6 8 
7 12 
5 3 
100% 100% 
(%) (%) 
Investment goods 63 43 
Fuels. minerals, and molels 4 43 
Foodstuffs 13 0 
Raw rnalerials 0 ! 
Consumer goods II 2 AgriculiUral goods 3 
Chemicals 2 
Other3 100% 100% 
Total 
Source: Consttucled from dala in The World Bank (1991:1: 150-51). 
!These data were compiled by The World Bank on the basis of shipmeniS ramer than balance of payments 
dala. th De tic People's Republic 
2 Includes CMEA countries plus Albania. China, Democratic ~mpucltea. e mocra 
of Korea. The Fao People's Democra1ic Republic and Yugoslavta 
3 Components may nol add 10 100 percenl due 10 rounding. 
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Table 3 
Economic Decline in Bulgaria, 1989-92 
1989 1990 1991 
Growth Rate of Real GOP(%) -2.5 -9.9 -13.5 
Agriculture -5.0 -3.7 7.7 
Industry 1.0 -12.5 -18.6 
Services -9.2 -6.1 -11.3 
Growth rates of$ value of: 
Exports of Goods and Services 1 -11.8 -26.8 -40.5 
Imports of Goods and Services 1 -0.3 -17.6 -47.0 
Inflation Rate (GOP deflator-%) 3.2 27.3 233.8 
Ave. Exchange Rate (Leva/$) 1.8 2.2 12.4 
GNP Per Capita (U.S.$) 2,830 2.180 1.510 
Unemployment Rate (end of 4thQ-%) 1.6 12.5 
Fiscal deficit (as% ofGDP) 1.5 9.5 14.9 
CWTent Account Cas % of GOP) -3.5 -8.3 -0.9 
Sources: The World Bank (1995. 1993:7 and 1992:2.16, and Table 8 annex). 
1 Non-factor services. 
Table 4 
1992 
-6.1 
-7.7 
-7.0 
-3.3 
21.5 
25.4 
64.7 
19.2 
1.360 
17.5 
4.6 
-4.0 
Cumulative 
%Change 
1989-92 
-28.7 
-9.1 
-33.1 
-26.9 
-53.3 
-45.4 
622.3 
1.029.4 
-56.8 
Political and Economic Reforms in Bulgaria, 1989-92 
1989 
November Todor Zhivkov, who had held power for 35 years. is replaced as Communist Pany leader and 
Chairman of the State Council by Peter Mladenov. 
December Mass demonstrations; National Assembly approves constitutional reform which removes communist 
political monopoly. 
1990 
February New government of Andrei Lukanov. Bulgarian Socialist Party C"BSP") installed. BSP is the former 
Communist Pany. 
April Peter Mladenov elected to Presidency by National Assembly. 
June Fli'St multiparty election to National Assembly .. BSP holds power in coalition cabinet 
September Bulgaria joins International Monetary Fund C"IMF'), thereby becoming eligible for balance of 
payments loans and providing a strong incentive for economic reforms. 
December Andrei Lukanov's government resigns in the midst of a general strike and mass demonstrations. 
Replaced by government of Dimitar Popov. 
1991 
February Major economic reforms enacted. Price controls removed (except on energy) and demonopolization 
programs begun; first land restitution law enacted (but implementation delayed); a unified floating 
exchange rate created: tight monetary policy to control inflation leads to high interest rates. 
May Law on foreign investment enacted; it was later replaced by a more liberal law in January 1992. 
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July Reform process slows as new constitution adopted; parliament blocks small business privatization 
program, worried that nomenklatura would seize ownership. 
145 
October National Assembly elections; the fli'St non-communist goverment is narrowly created in November by 
Filip Dirnitrov (UDF) as Prime Minister, in an informal coalition with the Turkish Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms ("MRF'). Of 240 seats, UDF won 110, BSP won 106, and MRF won 24. 
December Small business restitution begins. 
1992 
January 
April 
October 
Zhelev re-elected President in first direct voting by population. More liberal foreign investment law 
enacted to attract foreign capital inflows. 
Privatization law enacted. The law created an Agency for Privatization to carry out the sale of 
medium- and large-size companies. The Agency was not fully constituted until August, however, 
and did not begin work until September. 
Dimitrov government falls in crisis over economic policy and foreign affairs; the MFR. trade unions, 
the business lobby, and the mass media objected to austerity measures. In December Lyuben Berov 
becomes new Prime Minister. 
Table 5 
Measures of Structural Reform in Bulgaria, 1990-92 
1990 1991 
Real export growth per year(%) 
Private sector share of GOP(%) 
Private sector share of employment(%) 
Private sector share of agriculture (%) 
Government subsidies(% of GOP) 
-27 
2 
6 
29 
16 
-28 
15 
10 
35 
4 
10 
25 
14 
50 
2 
Source: The World Bank (1993:39). 
1 Estimated. 
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Figure 1 
Bulgaria's Trade with CMEA and Rest of World, 1980-89 
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Souru: The World Bank (1991). 
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